MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to Foreign Employer Job Discrimination under FCN Treaty Rights by Grasberger, Eric Allen
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COMMERCIAL REGULATION
Volume 16 | Number 1 Article 10
Winter 1991
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution
to Foreign Employer Job Discrimination under
FCN Treaty Rights
Eric Allen Grasberger
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric A. Grasberger, MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to Foreign Employer Job Discrimination under FCN Treaty Rights,
16 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 141 (1991).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol16/iss1/10
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution to Foreign Employer
Job Discrimination under FCN Treaty Rights
Cover Page Footnote
International Law; Commercial Law; Law
This note is available in North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/
ncilj/vol16/iss1/10
NOTES
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines: The Best Solution
to Foreign Employer Job Discrimination Under
FCN Treaty Rights
Introduction
The United States Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to
the Third Circuit's decision in MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines' al-
lowing foreign employers, pursuant to Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation ("FCN") Treaties, 2 intentionally to discriminate against
U.S. citizens on the basis of citizenship, but not on the basis of age,
race, sex, or national origin.3 The decision in MacNamara is signifi-
cant because it represents a departure from the conclusions of other
courts of appeals4 and because of the United States' widespread use
of similar treaties with other countries. 5 More generally, the issue is
significant because it involves the extent to which governments will
forego their domestic laws, and the protection of their citizens, in
order to attract foreign investment.
1 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
2 Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation are a series of post-World War
1I bilateral treaties that were generally designed to "define the treatment each country
owes the nationals of the other; their rights to engage in business and other activities
within the boundaries of the former; and the respect due them, their property, and their
enterprises." Walker, Modern Treatises of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REv. 805, 806 (1958) [hereinafter Modern Treaties]. See generally Walker, The Post-War Com-
mercial Treaty Program of the United States, 73 POL. Sci. Q. 57, 59 (1957) [hereinafter Treaty
Program]; Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment-Present
United States Practice, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 229, 229 (1956) [hereinafter Treaties for Protection].
Herman Walker Jr. served as the Adviser on Commercial Treaties at the State Department
and was responsible for formulation of the postwar FCN treaties. See Sumitomo Shoji
America Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 181 n.6 (1982) (citing Department of State Air-
gram A-105, Jan. 9, 1976).
3 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1140, 1141. According to MacNamara, American compa-
nies operating abroad have an identical right to discriminate under the FCN treaties. The
treaties are subject to varying interpretations by host country judiciary systems, but no
conflict between U.S. courts and foreign governments has yet arisen. See Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae at 10-11, Korean Air Lines v. MacNamara, 110 S. Ct. 349
(1989).
4 MacNamara vs. Korean Air Lines-Job Discrimination in U.S. by Foreign Companies, Vol.
XI, No. 4, INT'L LAW. NEWSL. 10, 11 (1989). For a detailed discussion of the split among
the circuits, see infra text accompanying notes 42-79.
5 Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 182 n.7 (1982). See, e.g.,
infra note 6.
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The heart of the controversy lies in the interpretation of article
VIII(l) of the FCN Treaty between the United States and Korea,
which provides that Korean companies with branch operations in the
United States can hire executive and other specialist employees "of
their choice" in the host country. 6 Foreign companies with overseas
operations seek a broad interpretation of the provision, one that al-
lows them to hire and fire employees without interference from host
country discrimination laws. 7 On the other hand, domestic citizens
employed by these foreign branches seek a narrow interpretation of
the employer choice provision, one that provides them with the
greatest amount of protection from the discriminatory acts of their
employer.8 The court's role is merely to give effect to the intent of
the treaty parties; 9 only when it is clear that Congress intended to
depart from the treaty obligations will inconsistent federal legislation
govern. 10
This Note examines the right of foreign companies under FCN
treaties to engage in employment discrimination in the United
States, and the competing right of U.S. citizens, under Title VII'
6 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 28, 1956, United States-
Korea, art. VIII, para. i, 8 U.S.T. 2217, 2223, T.I.A.S. No. 3947, at 8. Article VIII, para-
graph 1 provides:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their
choice. Moreover, such nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage
accountants and other technical experts regardless of the extent to which they may
have qualified for the practice ofa profession within the territories of such other Party, for
the particular purpose of making examinations, audits and technical investi-
gations for, and rendering reports to, such nationals and companies in con-
nection with the planning and operation of their enterprises, and enterprises
in which they have a financial interest, within such territories.
Id. (emphasis added). Similar provisions are contained in FCN treaties between the
United States and other countries. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion, Dec. 26, 1951, United States-Greece, art. XIII, para. 4, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1857-59,
T.I.A.S. No. 3057, at 13; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951,
United States-Israel, art. VIII, para. 1, 5 U.S.T. 550, 558, T.I.A.S. No. 2948, at 8; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-Federal Republic of
Germany, art. VIII, para. 1, 7 U.S.T. 1839, 1848, T.I.A.S. No. 3593, at 8.
7 See, e.g., MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1138.
8 Id.
9 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185.
10 McCullough v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963) (citing The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988). Section 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex or national origin, or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
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and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"),1 2 to be
free from discrimination based on their age, race, sex, citizenship,
and national origin.' 3 Part I of this Note provides the facts and hold-
ing of the MacNamara decision. Part II elaborates on the decisions of
other circuits and illustrates how MacNamara creates a further split of
authority on this issue. Part III provides an in-depth analysis of the
MacNamara decision, examining first the intent of the parties and
general purpose of the FCN Treaty between the United States and
Korea; second, the critical distinction between citizenship discrimi-
nation permitted under the Treaty and national origin discrimination
prohibited under Title VII; and third, the imposition of liability on
foreign companies for unintentional discrimination based on "dispa-
rate impact."' 4 This Note concludes that the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in MacNamara provides the best solution to foreign employer
job discrimination in the United States in that it comports with the
U.S. foreign policy goal of effectuating the intent of the parties to the
Treaty while at the same time remaining consistent with the domestic
policy goal of protecting our citizens from discriminatory treatment
in employment.
I. The Facts and Holding of MacNamara
A. The Facts
Thomas MacNamara is a U.S. citizen who began working as a
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
12 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). Section 4(a) of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, as amended, provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this Act.
13 Id. See also supra note 12.
14 "Disparate impact" discrimination is unintentional discrimination. A claim based
on disparate impact is supported by a showing that a particular employer's hiring practices
operate in a way that disproportionately excludes members of a protected class. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971). To establish a prima facie case of disparate
impact discrimination, the "plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in
question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern." Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). The employer may defend against Title VII liability
by demonstrating that the practice is a business necessity. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at
329; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The plaintiff may counter the business necessity defense by
showing that there are other equally effective hiring practices with fewer discriminatory
effects. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
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salesman with Korean Airlines ("KAL") in 1974.15 In 1977,
MacNamara received a promotion to the position of district sales
manager for the area covering Delaware, Pennsylvania, and southern
New Jersey.16 In June 1982, MacNamara was terminated at the age
of 57 and was replaced by a 42-year-old Korean man who formerly
held a top position at KAL's office in Washington.' 7 As part of the
apparent reorganization of its U.S. operations, KAL terminated a to-
tal of six American managers in the United States, including
MacNamara, and replaced them with four Korean citizens.' 8
In November 1982, MacNamara filed suit against KAL alleging
that he had been discriminated against on the basis of age, race, and
national origin.' 9 In January 1963, KAL filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, insisting that its conduct was privileged under the "of
their choice" provision of article VIII(l) of the Korean FCN
Treaty. 20 MacNamara responded that this provision granted foreign
companies only the right to hire managerial and technical personnel
on the basis of citizenship, and did not permit them a broad exemp-
tion under Title VII and the ADEA which prohibit discrimination on
the basis of age, race, sex and national origin. 2 '
B. The District Court's Decision
The district court granted KAL's motion to dismiss on the
ground that the signatory countries, particularly the United States,
intended that foreign companies would be assured of their ability to
"manage investments in the host country without interference. " 22
The court reasoned that, because the unconditional language of the
Treaty was drafted to provide foreign companies with immunity
from domestic employment laws, the Treaty could not be reconciled
with Title VII and the ADEA. 23 It is settled law, as the district court
noted, that when a conflict arises between domestic legislation and
rights afforded in a treaty, the treaty must prevail.2 4 Thus, the dis-
trict court held that in employment decisions regarding "essential
personnel," 2 5 foreign companies could discriminate in any manner,
15 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1137.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 1138.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. The Third Circuit on appeal found that the Treaty language, "permitted to
engage ... executive personnel," meant that the proper inquiry for determining who are
"essential personnel" or who is an "executive" is not whether the replaced employee was
considered an "executive," but whether his job responsibilities had been reassigned to a
person who was an "executive" within the meaning of the Treaty. Id. at 1140-42 (empha-
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without regard to U.S. laws, as long as the result of the conduct was
to favor a Korean citizen. Those decisions that did not favor a Ko-
rean citizen or involve an essential position would be subject to Title
VII and the ADEA. 26
C. The Third Circuit's Decision
The Third Circuit reversed and remanded the summary judg-
ment ruling of the district court, holding that foreign companies
were only permitted under the Treaty to hire their own citizens over
citizens of the host country when that decision was made because of
their citizenship. 27 This decision is significantly distinguishable from
the district court's decision to permit discrimination that favors for-
eign citizens. 28 While the district court would permit age, race, sex,
and national origin discrimination so long as a citizen of the em-
ployer's home country was hired (i.e., "favored") as a replacement,
the court of appeals would not tolerate those forms of discrimination
regardless of who was hired. It is also important to note that the
Third Circuit's view prohibits citizenship discrimination when it is
deliberately used as a pretext for age, race, sex, or national origin
discrimination.2 9
In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit in MacNamara
made two significant "sub-holdings." First, in order to avoid a total
conflict between the Treaty and domestic law, the court found that
intentional national origin discrimination, as prohibited by Title VII,
and intentional citizenship discrimination, as permitted by article
VIII(l) of the Treaty, are separate and distinct phenomena.30 In
support of this conclusion, the court cited the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co.31 to illustrate that Title
VII's prohibition of national origin discrimination was not intended
to bar discrimination on the basis of citizenship. 32 The plaintiff in
sis added). The requirement of "executive" status under the Treaty may be satisfied even
if the replacement was considered an executive only by reason of his duties in addition to
the duties he received from the former employee. Id.
Furthermore, being admitted to the United States with E-I Treaty Trader status is
strong evidence of "executive" status. Id. at 1142. An analysis of the employment status
covered under the Treaty is beyond the scope of this Note.
26 Id. at 1138.
27 Id. at 1140. The court stated: "Article VIII(I) was not intended to provide foreign
businesses with shelter from any law applicable to personnel decisions other than those
that would logically or pragmatically conflict with the right to select one's own nationals as
managers because of their citizenship." Id. (emphasis in original).
28 Id. at 1138.
29 Id. at 1141. The court stated: "We believe that a foreign business may not deliber-
ately undertake to reduce the age of its workforce by replacing older Americans with
younger foreign nationals." Id.
30 Id. at 1146.
31 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
32 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147 (citing Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88). The Third Circuit
stated: "Inherent in the [Supreme] Court's reading of Title VII and its history, is a Con-
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Espinoza was a Mexican citizen who was refused employment by a
U.S. company because she was not a U.S. citizen.33 The Court found
that a refusal to hire those who lack U.S. citizenship does not by itself
constitute national origin discrimination as prohibited by Title VII.3 4
The Court noted, however, that a citizenship requirement may be
illegal if it has the purpose or unintended effect of creating national
origin discrimination. 35 Since the defendant company was found by
the Court to have not discriminated against employees of Mexican
ancestry36 (i.e., Mexican national origin), the citizenship requirement
was upheld.3 7
The second sub-holding of MacNamara was that liability for un-
intentional discrimination based on disparate impact claims (as op-
posed to intentional disparate treatment claims) could not be
imposed on foreign employers. 38 This decision was made because
the court perceived a partial conflict between Title VII and article
VIII(l) of the Treaty.39 The conflict occurs when foreign companies
from countries with homogeneous population exercise their Treaty
rights to hire their own citizens. 40 Since their citizens were largely of
the same national origin, the companies' managerial and technical
staff are almost exclusively composed of a single national origin.
The result is unintentional disparate impact discrimination prohib-
ited by Title VII. 4 1
II. The Split Among the Circuits
The Third Circuit's decision in MacNamara does not stand alone
on the issue of foreign employer job discrimination in the United
States. Three other circuits have considered the issue and all have
reached different conclusions. The disagreement among the courts
focuses not only on the proper scope of the treaty rights, but also on
the methodology employed in reconciling those rights with the
rights provided under Title VII.
A. The Second Circuit
The Second Circuit in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.42
gressional determination that a trier of fact can distinguish national origin discrimination
from citizenship discrimination and, accordingly, that courts can impose liability on the
basis of the former without imposing it for the latter." Id.
33 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 87.
34 Id. at 95-96.
35 Id. at 92.
36 Id. at 93.
37 Id. at 95-96.
38 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
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was the first appellate court to consider the relationship between
FCN treaties and Title VII.4 s Sumitomo Shoji America is a wholly
owned New York subsidiary of a Japanese commercial firm. Female
secretarial employees brought a class action against the corporation
under Title VII alleging that the corporation had a discriminatory
policy of filling its management-level positions exclusively with male
Japanese nationals. 44
The court first concluded that the Japanese subsidiary, although
incorporated in the United States, could invoke the FCN treaty45
rights to the same degree as a Japanese corporation incorporated in
Japan. The court then held that the Treaty did not, however, give
the subsidiary sweeping immunity from American discrimination
laws. 46 Reasoning that article VIII(l) was primarily intended to ex-
empt foreign companies from local "percentile legislation" 4 7 which
is a law requiring foreign companies to employ a certain percentage
of American citizens, the court suggested that the Treaty and Title
VII could be reconciled by broadening the bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) exception to Title VII. 48 This exception per-
mitted intentional discrimination should the discriminatory conduct
be reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's
business .49
The Third Circuit in MacNamara and the Second Circuit in Avig-
liano agreed on the proper scope of article VIII(l) of the FCN trea-
ties. Both courts found that the aim was to avoid percentile
legislation and not to grant a broad exemption from all discrimina-
tion laws. 50
43 A New York federal district court previously considered the same issue and was the
first to apply the theory later announced by the Second Circuit in Avigliano. See Linskey v.
Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
44 Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 553.
45 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Ja-
pan, art. VIII, para. 1, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2070, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, at 8. The FCN treaty with
Japan is identical in relevant part to the Korean treaty at issue in MacNamara. See supra
note 6.
46 Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 558.
47 Id. at 559 (citing Walker, Treaty Protection, supra note 2, at 234).
48 Id.
49 Title VII provides in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees .... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in
those certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). Traditionally the exception has been construed narrowly. See
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). Since the defense was designed to ac-
commodate legitimate business needs, it requires the employer to prove that: (I) there was
a reasonable basis to believe that all or substantially all of the protected class cannot per-
form the job safely or efficiently; or (2) that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal
with the class on an individual basis. Note, Yankees Out of North America: Foreign EmployerJob
Discrimination Against American Citizens, 83 MICH. L. REv. 237, 249 (1984).
50 See Avigliano, 638 F.2d at 558-59; MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1144.
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The Third and Second Circuits significantly differed, however,
on the method of reconciling the treaties with Title VII. The Third
Circuit simply found that the national origin discrimination prohib-
ited under Title VII and the citizenship discrimination permitted
under the Treaty did not conflict.5' By contrast, the Second Circuit
apparently found such a conflict and created the enlarged BFOQex-
ception to reconcile Title VII with the foreign employer's rights
under the Treaty. 52
B. The Supreme Court
In Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,53 the Supreme Court
vacated the Second Circuit's decision and found that the wholly
owned subsidiary incorporated in the United States was not a com-
pany of Japan under the meaning of article XXII(3) of the Treaty54
and was therefore not covered by the FCN Treaty.55
Although the Court expressly declined to interpret the scope of
article VIII(l) of the U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty, 56 it did state in dictum
that the FCN treaties were intended to allow foreign companies to
operate in the United States on an equal basis with domestic compa-
nies. 57 There was no intent, declared the Court, to provide foreign
companies with greater rights than domestic companies. 58
C. The Fifth Circuit
Several months.after the Second Circuit's decision in Avigliano,
but before the Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo, the Fifth Cir-
cuit expressed a very different interpretation of the employer choice
provision in the Japanese FCN Treaty. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Company
(America) 59 involved a wholly owned New York subsidiary of a Japa-
nese corporation which was sued by its employees for making pro-
51 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
52 See supra notes 48-49.
53 457 U.S. 176 (1982). The correct spelling of respondent's name is "Avagliano,"
not "Avigliano," as used in the lower courts.
54 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United States-Ja-
pan, art. XXII, para. 3, 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2079-80, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, at 22. Article XXII,
paragraph 3 provides:
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corpora-
tions, partnerships, companies and other associations, whether or not with
limited liability and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies consti-
tuted under the applicable laws and regulations within the territories of
either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have their juridical status
recognized within the territories of the other Party.
Id. (emphasis added).
55 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
56 Id. at 180 n.4.
57 Id. at 187-88.
58 Id.
59 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130, vacated, 457 U.S. 1128
(1982).
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motions and benefits available only to employees of Japanese
citizenship.6° The company moved for dismissal on the grounds that
it was absolutely immune from U.S. discrimination claims under arti-
cle VIII(l) of the Treaty. 61
The trial court reasoned that since the company had been incor-
porated under the laws of the United States, it was not a "company
of Japan" within the meaning of article XXII(3) and could not assert
any of the protections afforded under the Treaty. 62 The Fifth Circuit
reversed, however, holding that the Treaty not only covered the ac-
tions of a foreign subsidiary incorporated in the United States, 63 but
also that it permitted these companies to decide who will manage
their investment in the host country "without regard to host country
laws."64
MacNamara and Spiess are in direct conflict. MacNamara held that
the U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty provides foreign employers with the abil-
ity to discriminate only because of citizenship. 65 Spiess held that the
U.S.-Japan FCN Treaty provides foreign employers with an absolute
immunity from all types of discrimination claims so long as the re-
placement is an executive or technical employee and is a citizen of
Japan.66
D. The Sixth Circuit
Three years after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Spiess, and two
years after the Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo, the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Wickes v. Olympic Airways67 articulated yet another view of the
relationship between domestic discrimination laws and FCN treaties.
60 Id. at 355.
61 Id.
62 Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 469 F. Supp. 1, 6 (S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 643
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 454 U.S. 1130, vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
63 Spiess, 643 F.2d at 358-59. This part of Spiess has been overruled by the Supreme
Court in Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
64 Spiess, 643 F.2d at 360-61. The court stated:
We agree [with plaintiffs] that an overriding goal of the Treaty negotia-
tors was to provide national treatment to foreign businesses operating in the
host country. However, national treatment was not the Treaty's exclusive
measure of the rights to be accorded to foreign nationals. It is apparent that
article VIII(l)'s "of their choice" provision was intended, not to guarantee
national treatment, but to create an absolute rule permitting foreign nation-
als to control their overseas investments. As we noted above, absolute rules
played a significant role in defining the rights of parties. The language of
article VIII(l) makes clear that the "of their choice" provision was designed
to establish such a rule. Use of the phrase "of their choice" does not express
the requirement that the parties are limited to national treatment. This is
accentuated by the fact that the phrase "nationals of either Party shall be
accorded national treatment" appears repeatedly in other provisions in the
Treaty.
Id. See infra text accompanying notes 96-104 for a discussion of treatment standards.
65 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1140.
66 Spiess, 643 F.2d at 361.
67 745 F.2d at 364 (6th Cir. 1984).
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Olympic Airways, an airline incorporated in Greece, 68 was sued
by Wickes, a 61-year-old former district sales manager in Michigan.
Wickes claimed that Olympic discriminated against him on the basis
of age and national origin in violation of Michigan's Civil Rights Act
of 1976.69 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
claiming a wholesale immunity from Title VII under article XII(4) of
the 1951 U.S.-Greece FCN Treaty. 70
The Sixth Circuit rejected Olympic Airway's broad proposition
and found that there was substantial evidence from the Treaty's leg-
islative history that the parties to the Treaty intended article XII(4)
to be narrowly construed.7 1 Thus, Greek companies operating in the
United States were permitted to discriminate "in favor of their own
nationals or citizens for certain high level positions, but not to dis-
criminate against others in the labor force of the host country on any
other basis." '72
Despite the court's use of the troubling language "discrimina-
tion in favor of" 73 it is clear from the opinion as a whole that the
Sixth Circuit is directly in accord with the Third Circuit's decision in
MacNamara. Both courts hold that foreign companies are permitted
to favor their own citizens only when the decision is based solely on
citizenship, and not on any of the grounds prohibited under Title
68 Id. at 364. Since the defendants were incorporated in Greece, there was no issue in
this case of whether or not the Treaty covered the defendants.
69 Id. The plaintiff in Wickes did not properly file the federal administrative claims
which are a prerequisite to a suit under Title VII of the ADEA and was thus barred by the
statute of limitations from bringing his claim under federal law. Id. The claim was
brought under the analogous Michigan law which provides that an employer may not:
Fail or refuse to hire, or recruit, or discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, na-
tional origin, age, sex, height, weight or marital status.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (West Supp. 1984).
70 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Aug. 3-Dec. 26, 1951, United
States-Greece, art. XII, para. 4, 5 U.S.T. 1829, 1859, T.I.A.S. No. 3057, at 8. The lan-
guage of article XII, paragraph 4 differs from article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Treaty with
Korea. It provides:
Nationals and companies of either party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical ex-
perts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other employees of their
choice among those legally in the country and eligible to work. Moreover,
such nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage, on a temporary
basis, accountants and other technical experts, regardless of nationality.
Id. (emphasis added).
71 Wickes, 745 F.2d at 365.
72 Id. at 367. The court noted: "The words 'of their choice' merely reflect the intent
of both the United States and Greece to give the other's companies the freedom to fill
designated critical positions without interference from local laws and regulations." See
generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 37-78 (1968). The "lo-
cal laws and regulations" referred to by the court were percentile restrictions. See Wickes,
745 F.2d at 367 n.1.
73 Wickes, 745 F.2d at 367. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text for discussion
on the distinction between discrimination "in favor of citizens" and discrimination "be-
cause of citizenship."
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VII.74
The Third and Sixth Circuits also employed the same methodol-
ogy in reaching their conclusions, as neither court perceived a con-
flict between the Treaty and Title VII. 75 While the Third Circuit
relied on Supreme Court precedent to distinguish citizenship dis-
crimination from national origin discrimination, 76 the Sixth Circuit
simply stated that "[c]itizenship per se is not a classification listed in
the Michigan employment discrimination law."'77
Thus, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Third Circuits have all ruled
on the relationship between FCN treaties and Title VII. Among
these decisions, there are two different interpretations of the scope
of the Treaty,78 and three different methods of analysis. 79 Part III of
this Note examines the MacNamara decision, and concludes that the
Third Circuit provides not only the best solution to the problem, but
also the best method of arriving at that solution.
Il. Analysis of the MacNamara Decision
MacNamara v. Korean Airlines is the most recent judicial declara-
tion on the rights of foreign corporations to engage in employment
discrimination in the United States under FCN treaties. As a result,
the Third Circuit had before it the full range of judicial precedent,
including the Supreme Court's decision in Sumitomo. This Note ana-
lyzes the reasoning behind, and impact of, the Third Circuit's deci-
sion to: (1) limit foreign employer discriminatory conduct to
decisions made on the basis of citizenship; (2) distinguish national
origin discrimination from citizenship discrimination; and (3) disal-
low claims for disparate impact liability against foreign companies
protected under the Treaty.
A. Analysis of the Third Circuit's Reasoning
1. Interpretation of the Treaty
The basic controversy is whether a literal or non-literal interpre-
74 Silver, Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaties and United States Discrimination Law:
The Right of Branches of Foreign Companies To Hire Executives "Of Their Choice," 57 FORDHAM L.
REV. 765, 772-73 (1989).
75 See Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368; MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1140-41
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989).
76 See MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146-47, where the court relied on Espinoza v. Farah
Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
77 Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368.
78 The disagreement in the scope of the Treaty is between Spiess on the one side, and
Avigliano, Wickes, and MacNamara on the other.
79 The disagreement in analysis is a three-way split between AMacNamara and IWiches on
one side, Spiess on the second side and Avigliano on the third. Avigliano differs from
MacNamara and Wickes because the former apparently found a conflict between Title VII
and the Treaty while the latter two cases did not. Since these three cases agreed on the
scope of the Treaty, Avigliano must have construed Title VII to prohibit citizenship
discrimination.
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tation of article VIII(1) of the U.S.-Korea FCN Treaty should be fol-
lowed. The following is an analysis of the issues that have been
raised in arriving at a proper construction of the Treaty. Again, the
court's role is to give effect to the intent of the signatory parties,80
and, Whenever possible, construe the Treaty in a way that avoids con-
flict with domestic law.8'
a. The plain language argument
The first issue that the courts have considered is whether the
plain meaning of the "of their choice" 82 language in article VIII(l)
offers any guidance. The Supreme Court stated in Sumitomo that ab-
sent substantial reasons to the contrary, the plain meaning of the
Treaty should control.83 At issue in Sumitomo, however, was not the
scope of the Treaty rights under article VIII(I),84 but simply whether
a wholly owned subsidiary incorporated in the United States could
invoke such rights.8 5 In order to address that issue, the Court had to
define the term "company of either party" as used in article
VIII(l).86 The Court resorted to the definitional provision of the
Treaty, article XXII(3), 87 and it was the language of that provision to
which the Court applied the literal language test.""
By contrast, the disputed language in MacNamara is not defined
in the Treaty. There is no expressed intention of the signatory par-
ties that is deserving of a literal interpretation. The most literal in-
terpretation of the words "of their choice" would permit foreign
companies to be free from discrimination laws altogether, even when
making decisions among solely American applicants. 89 Both parties
agreed that such an interpretation would be untenable.90
KAL instead argued that it is permitted to ignore discrimination
80 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 185.
81 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938);
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1940). Although these cases dealt with state
laws, a fortiori, the same rule applies to federal laws. See Brief for Respondent at 25,
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji (America), Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 454 U.S.
962 (1981), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 176 (1982).
82 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
83 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180. In Sumitomo, the Court stated: "The clear import of
treaty language controls unless 'application of the words of the treaty according to their
obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its signato-
ries."' Id. (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963) and The Amiable
Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1821)).
84 The Court expressly declined to reach the issue of the scope of the Treaty and its
relation to Title VII. See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 n.4.
85 Id. at 177-78.
86 See supra note 6.
87 See supra note 54.
88 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 189.
89 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1143.
90 Id.
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laws only when its decision favors a Korean citizen. 9 ' This argument
appears equally untenable, however, because the strong second sen-
tence of article VIII(l) is inconsistent with such an interpretation. 9 2
This sentence provides that foreign companies can employ their own
"experts" even though they may not meet the qualifications or stan-
dards required by similar American experts. 93 If the first sentence
gives foreign employers the absolute right to hire their citizens with-
out restraint from any domestic employment laws, the additional
right expressly given in the second sentence would be unnecessary
and redundant. 94 Since such an inconsistency is unlikely to have es-
caped the scrutiny of the Treaty drafters, it is plausible to assert that
the first sentence was not intended to grant such broad immunity.
9 5
b. The standard of treatment argument
The second factor involved in interpreting the treaty is the
"standard of treatment" that the host country was, by agreement, to
afford the visiting companies of the other treaty party. The highest
standard is the "absolute" or "non-contingent" standard. When it
applies, the foreign companies can have certain privileges "whether
or not a host government provides the same rights to the indigenous
population." 9 6 The next highest standard is "national treatment."
This standard assures foreign nationals that they will be treated
equally with native citizens. 9 7 Lastly, "most-favored-nation treat-
ment" promises foreigners that they will be treated at least as favora-
bly as any other foreign nationals residing in the United States.
9 8
The Third Circuit concluded, with the consent of both
MacNamara and KAL, that the rights given in article VIII(l) extend
"beyond national treatment." 9 9 Although the parties did not specifi-
cally agree on how far beyond national treatment these rights go, 10 0
they are necessarily stating that foreign companies operating in the
United States have some right under the Treaty that domestic com-
panies do not have. It may appear that the court has not granted a
greater right by merely allowing foreign employers to discriminate
on the basis of citizenship because American companies are also per-
91 Id. at 1144. The court stated: "KAL argues in effect that it has the right under
Article VIII(I) to choose a citizen of Korea for an executive position for any reason and a
concomitant right to be free from judicial scrutiny of its subjective motivation in choosing
the Korean citizen." Id. (emphasis in original).
92 Id. at 1145.
93 See supra note 6.
94 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1145.
95 Id.
96 Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 2, at 823 n.2. See also Wilson, Postwar Commercial
Treaties of the United States, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 262, 264 (1949).
97 Walker, Modern Treaties, supra note 2, at 811 n.2.
98 Id.
99 MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1143 (3rd Cir. 1988).
100 Id. at 1144.
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mitted to engage in citizenship discrimination.' t0 Nevertheless,
when citizenship discrimination has the purpose or effect of discrimi-
nating on the basis of national origin, Title VII will prohibit such
conduct.' 0 2 Although the court never expressly stated this rationale,
it appears that the "greater right" given foreign companies under
MacNamara is freedom from disparate impact liability, i.e., the right
to hire on the basis of citizenship even though the exercise of such
right could result in the almost exclusive employment of Korean na-
tional managers and specialist employees.10 3 Domestic companies
do not have such a right 104
c. The negotiating history of article VIII(l)
A third issue raised in interpreting the Treaty was the historical
background or origin of the employer choice provision. By tracing
its origin, the court hoped to establish the true intent or purpose of
the provision and consequently determine its scope. The only sub-
stantive evidence of the drafters' intent in including the employer
choice provision appears to be governmental documentation (i.e.,
letters and despatches) indicating that the main objective was to
avoid percentile restrictions. 10 5 KAL argued that the provision was
aimed at "percentile restrictions and the like,"' 0 6 and that the latter
101 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 95. The Court stated: "[N]othing in [Title VII] makes it ille-
gal to discriminate on the basis of citizenship or alienage." Id.
102 Id. at 92. The Supreme Court stated in Espinoza:
[A] citizenship requirement might be but one part of a wider scheme of un-
lawful national origin discrimination. In other cases, an employer might use
a citizenship test as a pretext to disguise what is in fact national-origin dis-
crimination. Certainly Tit[le] VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of cit-
izenship whenever it has the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis
of national origin.
Id.
103 See infra text accompanying notes 131-137 for a discussion of disparate impact lia-
bility under MacNamara.
104 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 92.
105 See, e.g., Foreign Service Despatch No. 144 from the U.S. Embassy, The Hague, to
Dept. of State, Aug. 16, 1954 ("the big problem to which [article VIII(l)] was addressed
was so-called percentile legislation..."); Foreign Service Despatch No. 914 from the U.S.
Embassy, Brussels, to Dept. of State, Mar. 11, 1955 ("The Belgians proposed to clarify the
wording [of article VIII(l)] by inserting a local laws clause; but the U.S. side replied that
such a broad exception would leave the way open for precisely the abuse the sentence was
designed to correct, namely, 'percentile' laws and other governmental fiats circumscribing
freedom of choice of high-grade personnel on a purely nationality basis."); Foreign Ser-
vice Despatch No. 2075 from the U.S. Embassy, Paris, to Dept. of State, May 7, 1959 (U.S.
negotiators worried about French percentile laws); Foreign Service Despatch No. 2529
from HICOG, Bonn, to Dept. of State, Mar. 18, 1954 (Purpose of article VIII(l) of Treaty
with Germany "is to preclude the imposition of 'percentile' legislation. It gives freedom of
choice as among persons lawfully present in the country and occupationally qualified
under the local law.")
106 KAL found that language in Walker, Treaties for Protection, supra note 2, at 234 n.2.
"[F]irm rights are provided for the entry and indefinite sojourn of international traders
and principal investors. Though equal provision for subordinate investor-enterprise em-
ployees is not yet possible owing to lack of statutory authority, such personnel is to an
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part of that phrase included discrimination laws."' 0 7 KAL reasoned
that the treaty drafters meant to exclude all such laws from applica-
tion to foreign companies because discrimination laws, much like
percentile legislation, inhibited foreign investment by restricting crit-
ical employment decisions.
It seems unlikely, though, that a goal as significant as avoiding
host country discrimination laws would, intentionally or mistakenly,
be left out of the language of the Treaty. It is even more unlikely
that such an intent, if it existed, would not be reflected in any of the
same Treaty negotiations that discussed percentile restrictions.
d. The "Model Treaty" argument
The fourth significant factor in interpreting the Treaty is the ex-
tent to which the treaty with Uruguay,10 8 which served as a model for
most subsequent FCN treaties, indicates the intentions of the draft-
ers of the treaty with Korea. The Uruguayan treaty uses the lan-
guage "of their choice .. .regardless of nationality," while the Korean
treaty simply reads "of their choice."' 0 9 It is clear that the Uru-
guayan treaty expressly permits discrimination on the basis of na-
tionality (or citizenship) without providing similar language for age,
sex, race, or national origin.
One possible explanation of why this qualifying language was
left out of the Korean treaty is that the phrase "of their choice" was
merely shorthand for "of their choice . . .regardless of national-
ity."' 10 Another possibility is that the drafters left it out because
they no longer wanted the discrimination to be limited to a citizen-
ship basis only. Neither argument is particularly persuasive. First, it
is unlikely that treaty drafters employ shorthand methods without so
indicating. Second, it is inexplicable why the drafters, if they desired
other forms of discrimination to be permitted, did not simply add the
language "regardless of age, race, sex, and national origin."
It seems, then, that the language in other treaties is not particu-
larly helpful in determining the scope of article VIII(l). The only
observation with any potential significance is that while some FCN
treaties employ, or have employed, the "regardless of nationality"
extent provided for, in that management is assured freedom of choice in the engaging of
essential executive and technical employees in general, regardless of their nationality,
without legal interference from 'percentile' restrictions and the like." Id. (emphasis added).
107 Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (Am.), 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 454
U.S. 1130, vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
108 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Economic Development, Nov. 23, 1949,
United States-Uruguay, art. V, para. 4, reprinted in 96 CONG. REC. 12,082, 12,083 (1950).
109 See supra note 6.
110 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1953) (describing four treaties, including three with the shortened "of their
choice" language, as containing a "[r]ight to engage technical and managerial personnel
regardless of nationality").
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language, "'1 there are no FCN treaties that have ever stated "regard-
less of nationality, age, race, sex, and national origin."
e. The State Department's viewpoint
The final issue, one that all courts have found significant, is the
meaning attached to article VIII(l) by the Department of State.
Since the State Department is the agency charged with the negotia-
tion and enforcement of FCN treaties, its view is entitled to "great
weight."' '2 The State Department's amicus brief in MacNamara de-
clared that article VIII(I) merely "creat[ed] a limited privilege to hire
[its own citizens], not a broad exemption from laws that prohibit dis-
crimination on grounds unrelated to citizenship."ll1 KAL argued in
MacNamara that the State Department's interpretation conflicted
with that of the Korean government's. 14 The Third Circuit found
no such conflict.' Indeed, the Korean government only twice ex-
pressed its views on the matter, and neither of those views dealt with
the scope of the treaty right." 6 Apparently, if Korea does disagree,
they are doing so silently.
2. Intentional vs. Unintentional Discrimination
a. No conflict exists between Title VII and article VIII(l)
regarding intentional discrimination
Since a treaty prevails over conflicting domestic law, 117 the only
way the Third Circuit in MacNamara could prohibit intentional dis-
crimination based on age, race, sex, and national origin was to con-
clude that there is no conflict between Title VII and article VIII(l) of
the Treaty.
The Supreme Court, in Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing, Inc.,
clearly stated that nationality (or citizenship) refers to the status of
belonging to a country through birth or naturalization while national
origin refers to the country from which a person or his ancestors
came." Congress never intended national origin discrimination
I 11 See, e.g., Treaty with Uruguay, supra note 108.
112 Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 (citing Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194
(1961)). See also Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court, 482 U.S. 552, 535-36 & n.17 (1987).
113 MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135, 1146 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 349 (1989) (emphasis added) (citing the State Department's Brief).
114 See Brief for Petitioner at 9, Korean Airlines v. MacNamara, 110 S. Ct. 349 (1989)
(Nos. 88-1449 and 88-1551).
115 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146 n.13. KAL offered no support for this assertion. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11, Korean Air Lines v. MacNamara, 110 S.
Ct. 349 (1989) (Nos. 88-1449 and 88-1551) (hereinafter U.S. Brief).
116 U.S. Brief, supra note 115, at 11.
117 Id.
118 Espinoza, 414 U.S. at 88.
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under Title VII to embrace citizenship discrimination.' 19 In fact, if
such an intent did exist, Congress has "flouted its own declaration of
policy"' 120 because the federal government has, in various circum-
stances, engaged in citizenship discrimination.' 2'
Although MacNamara relied on these findings to avoid a conflict
of law, neither the Second Circuit in Avigliano, the Fifth Circuit in
Spiess, nor the Sixth Circuit in Wickes ever cited the Supreme Court
decision in Espinoza. In fact, it is apparent that the Second Circuit in
Avigliano found a direct conflict between Title VII and article VIII(l).
As a result, the court was forced to create a broadened bona fide
occupational qualification exception under Title VII1 2 2 in order to
achieve the desired result of reconciling the Treaty with domestic
law.
As MacNamara has illustrated, manipulating established excep-
tions to Title VII is unnecessary and overly burdensome on the for-
eign employer. The Third Circuit noted that it is more difficult for
the foreign employer, under the Second Circuit's approach, to prove
that the use of foreign managers is reasonably necessary to the suc-
cess of its business, than it is for the employer, under the Third Cir-
cuit's analysis, to simply show that it favored its own citizens because
they were such citizens.123
The Spiess court never attempted a reconciliation of the two laws
because they found that the plain, unequivocal language of the
Treaty created an absolute right to discriminate not only on citizen-
ship, but also on age, race, sex, and national origin. 124 The Fifth Cir-
cuit, therefore, had no reason to seek out a Supreme Court case
distinguishing citizenship from national origin because it still would
have had to reconcile the remaining issues of age, race, and sex dis-
crimination with Title VII.
The Sixth Circuit in Wickes also failed to make reference to the
Supreme Court's holding in Espinoza. The Sixth Circuit simply
stated that there was no conflict between article VIII(l) citizenship
discrimination and the Michigan statute. 25 The most likely reason
for the Sixth Circuit's failure to cite Espinoza was that the conflicts
issue was never brought out by the parties. The court stated that,
"[t]o the extent that plaintiff may claim on remand that Greek citi-
zenship and national origin are synonymous and that Michigan law
prevents Olympic from giving preference to Greek citizens in man-
agement and technical positions, such a claim would conflict with the
119 d. at 89.
120 Id. at 90.
121 Id. at 89.
122 See supra notes 48-49.
123 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1146-47 n.14.
124 Spiess, 643 F.2d at 359.
125 Wickes, 745 F.2d at 368.
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Treaty and the Treaty would prevail."' 26 It is likely that if the issue
were addressed on remand, the parties by that time would have dis-
covered the Espinoza decision and disputed its precedential force.
Thus, because MacNamara interpreted the Treaty to permit only
citizenship discrimination, it then could rely on Espinoza to reconcile
Title VII and article VIII(l). Both the foreign employer's Treaty
rights, as the court defined them, and the U.S. citizen's domestic
rights, were upheld in the context of intentional discrimination.
MacNamara also found that no conflict existed with regard to
"mixed-motive" cases. 12 7 These are cases in which the plaintiff has
succeeded in showing that the intentional discrimination was a sub-
stantial or motivating factor, but not the sole factor, in the em-
ployer's conduct. 128 The plaintiff can only prevail if he can show that
"but for" the impermissible factor, the challenged conduct would
not have occurred.12 9 Thus, the court noted that in situations where
KAL's desire to favor Korean citizens may have played some role in
its decision to replace an American employee, there can be no liabil-
ity "unless the same decision would not have been made absent the
race, national origin, or age of the replaced individual."' 130 KAL is
not immune from such claims, however, and it must defend its em-
ployment decisions in U.S. courts.
b. A potential conflict does exist between Title VII and
article VIII(l) regarding unintentional discrimination
No courts prior to MacNamara considered whether citizenship
discrimination permitted under FCN treaties may have the effect of
creating unintentional national origin discrimination prohibited
under Title VII. MacNamara found that although no conflict existed
between the two laws for intentional discrimination, a conflict does
exist in the context of unintentional discrimination.' 3 '
Some courts have found that the logic underlying the Supreme
Court's decision in Espinoza is equally applicable whether the dis-
crimination conduct favors U.S. citizens or whether it favors individ-
uals having other nationalities.' 32 Nonetheless, at least one
commentator has argued that Espinoza is inapplicable to foreign em-
126 Id.
127 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147 n.15.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
13' Id. at 1148.
132 Dowling v. United States, 476 F. Supp. 1018, 1022 (D. Mass. 1979) (holding that
U.S. citizen failed to state a claim under Title VII for discrimination against United States
citizens in favor of Canadian citizens). See also Novak v. World Bank, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CCH) 30,021 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding discriminatory hiring practices of World Bank insuf-
ficient to state a claim under Title VII); Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights
Laws: The Case of Japanese Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 958 (1979).
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ployerjob discrimination suits because that decision was made in the
context of a U.S. citizenship requirement, not a foreign citizenship
requirement. 133
The significance of the distinction between a United States citi-
zenship requirement and a Korean citizenship requirement lies in
the fact that the United States is a heterogeneous society and Korea
is a homogeneous society. Thus, when companies like KAL hire
their own citizens within their article VIII(l) rights, the result is that
almost all of their employees will be of the same national origin and
race. 13 4 In Espinoza, the Supreme Court clearly stated that citizen-
ship discrimination is prohibited under Title VII when it has the pur-
pose or effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin.' 35
Since the Third Circuit in MacNamara recognized the conflict, it held
that U.S. citizens cannot state a claim against foreign employers for
disparate impact liability because their right to do so has been super-
seded by the treaty.136
As noted earlier, this holding gives foreign employers greater
rights than domestic companies and is consistent with the "beyond
national treatment" standard applied by the Third Circuit to the em-
ployer choice provision. 137 A contrary holding would in essence be
an act of discrimination against Korea on the basis of their society's
homogeneity. Their treaty rights would be significantly more re-
stricted than countries with heterogeneous populations because Ko-
rean companies trying to avoid disparate impact liability would have
to hire enough U.S. citizens (or perhaps citizens from other coun-
tries) to balance out the statistical makeup of their managerial
workforce. This result is plainly undesirable and inequitable, and
the Third Circuit's decision to disallow disparate impact claims is
well justified.
It is interesting to note that MacNamara did not limit the ban on
disparate impact claims to companies from only homogeneous coun-
tries. Presumably, this was done because the court did not wish to
set a precedent that would require courts to enter into factual deter-
minations of whether a particular country was homogeneous or
heterogeneous.
B. Impact of the MacNamara Decision on Foreign Investment in the
United States
The United States, as well as other nations, encourages foreign
investment because it creates jobs, broadens capital markets, and
133 See Note, supra note 49, at 245-46.
134 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
135 See supra note 96.
136 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1148.
137 See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
1991]
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
contributes to overall productivity and economic growth.' 3 8 Facili-
tating foreign investment is the primary objective of FCN treaty
negotiators.' 39 The Third Circuit's decision in MacNamara may ad-
versely affect foreign investment in the United States in two theoreti-
cally significant ways.
First, by subjecting the decisions of foreign employers to Title
VII constraints, MacNamara limits the ability of these companies to
fill critical positions with the people in whom they have the most con-
fidence.' 40 This in turn limits the success of overseas operations.
There are several legitimate reasons why foreign companies may
need to employ their own citizens. Unlike the vast majority of citi-
zens of the host country, their citizens have: (1) unique linguistic and
cultural skills; (2) knowledge of their country's products, markets,
customs and business practices; (3) familiarity with the personnel
and workings of the principal or parent enterprise in their home
country; and (4) acceptability to those persons with whom the com-
pany and branch does business. 14 1
These factors are important to successful business operations,
and MacNamara does not deny foreign employers the right to hire
their own citizens for any of these legitimate reasons. MacNamara
does prohibit hiring these citizens for the purpose of replacing old
employees with young ones, female employees with males, or em-
ployees of American national origin with those of Korean national
origin. These factors are not recognized as necessary for successful
business operations in either domestic or foreign markets.
The second source of concern over the MacNamara decision is
the increased litigation costs that will result from having to defend
employment decisions in U.S. courts.' 42 Although litigation over
personnel decisions is a burden that is shared by domestic compa-
nies, foreign companies feel that the confusion or local prejudice of
fact finders puts them at a disadvantage.' 43 The Third Circuit ad-
dressed this concern:
[W]hile we recognize that factfinders can and do err from time to
time, the relevant issue is whether there is reason to believe that the
instances of error will be materially greater in Title VII and ADEA
cases where a foreign employer has exercised its Article VIII(l) right
than in other cases filed under those statutes. Where a foreign busi-
ness has chosen one of its own citizens as an executive because he or
138 Note, supra note 49, at 251.
139 See Walker, Treaty Program, supra note 2, at 59; Walker, Treaties for Protection, supra
note 2, at 229.
140 Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d 353, 362 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed,
454 U.S. 1130, vacated, 457 U.S. 1128 (1982).
141 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1139.
142 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 457 U.S.
176 (1982).
143 MacNamara, 863 F.2d at 1147.
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she is such a citizen, we think the plaintiff is no more likely to suc-
ceed than any other employment discrimination plaintiff in convinc-
ing the trier of fact that the decision was made for some different,
impermissible reason.
144
If foreign companies were, in fact, treated with prejudice by U.S. fact
finders, the question still remaining would be whether the amount of
this prejudice is significant enough to justify granting them a whole-
sale immunity from domestic discrimination laws.
Concern over the impact of the MacNamara decision is not with-
out foundation.' 4 5 But none of the defendants in Avigliano, Spiess,
Wickes, or MacNamara have offered proof of any kind that they, or
companies like them, will discontinue investment in the United
States. The Third Circuit's decision is not a novel development, and
there has been no indication as yet that foreign investment has been
deterred as a result of the holding.' 4 6 Additionally, the State De-
partment has made it clear that they have received no representa-
tions by foreign governments that their country's business sector is
disinclined to invest in the United States. 14 7 One possible conclu-
sion is that income from operating in the United States simply out-
weigh the costs, including litigation fees and unfavorable judgments,
of doing business in the United States.
If the MacNamara court had adopted the alternate solution and
permitted foreign companies to discriminate in favor of their citizens
on any basis, the consequences could have been considerably worse
not only for the United States, but for foreign investors as well. Top
U.S. managers and specialists, aware of the treaty rights of foreign
companies, would avoid working for such companies for fear of be-
ing legitimately fired under discriminatory motives. Thus, these
companies would be hurting their chances of employing American
personnel who, due to their knowledge of the business and cultural
aspects of the United States, could be vital to a successful overseas
operation.
Assuming an American did show an interest in a foreign com-
pany, he or she would most likely insist on a clause in the employ-
ment contract providing assurances that the company will, despite
the treaty, act in accordance with domestic discrimination laws.
Thus, if a foreign employer ever decided to experiment with host
country personnel, the employer's treaty rights might be "contracted
away" one employee at a time.
A contrary holding would also have adverse impacts on the
United States. The morale of American citizens would be dimin-
ished by losing the protection from discrimination that they have
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 U.S. Brief, supra note 115, at 14.
147 Id.
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come to rely upon. Although it can be argued that they assumed
such a risk by working for a foreign company, some may have had no
alternative due to a tight job market, while others may simply have
been unaware of the companies' treaty rights until they actually suf-
fered the consequences.
This loss of confidence in the law and government might also be
directed against foreign investors. Stories of blatant discrimination
by "foreigners" would make excellent headlines in local and national
newspapers. The result could be to create a fear among foreign
companies of an inhospitable and economically unsupportive Ameri-
can populace; a fear that could potentially be the most significant
deterrent to foreign investment in the United States.
IV. Conclusion
In summary, MacNamara is the most recent interpretation by the
American judiciary on the relationship between FCN treaty rights
and domestic discrimination laws. In making its decision, the Third
Circuit had the benefit of the fully developed views of the Depart-
ment of State, the experience of the other circuit courts, and the di-
rectives of the Supreme Court. The MacNamara court employed
sound reasoning and considered all relevant factors in reaching an
interpretation that effectuated the most probable intent of the treaty
parties. The court effectively utilized the Espinoza decision to accom-
modate both the rights of foreign employers and the rights of do-
mestic employees without conflict. The decision was also
comprehensive and flexible in that it eliminated claims for uninten-
tional disparate impact without providing foreign companies immu-
nity from mixed motive liability. Lastly, MacNamara offers a solution
that should continue to facilitate foreign investment in the United
States without diminishing the morale of our nation's citizens, whom
the American judiciary has a solemn duty to protect.
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